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Teaching Economic Torts
Jay M. Feinman1
The primary goal of this Article is to proselytize for the teaching of an eco-
nomic torts course in the upper-level law school curriculum, particularly
a course that focuses on the business torts that form the core of a typical
non-personal injury civil litigation practice. In service of that goal, the Ar-
ticle surveys traditional and contemporary efforts to define the scope of
economic torts and to provide teaching materials, identifies some themes
and issues in those efforts, and comments on teaching methods that are
particularly appropriate for the course.
Tort law is, of course, a staple of the first-year law school curriculum,
and most tort courses spend the bulk of their time on issues arising out of
physical injuries to persons and, to a lesser extent, property. This focus is
driven partly by the conceptual structure of tort law, in which intentional
torts or perhaps negligence provide the paradigm case of tort liability. The
focus on personal injuries has intensified in recent decades as a result of
developments in the law and in law schools. The body of tort law has ex-
panded to encompass such topics as products liability, negligent infliction
of emotional distress, alternative compensation schemes, and mass torts, so
there is simply more to cover within the realm of personal injuries. At the
same time, many law schools have reduced the time allocated to the torts
course from the traditional two semesters to one, limiting the time avail-
able for peripheral subjects such as economic torts.
This is an opportune time to consider whether and how economic torts
should be taught. The American Law Institute, having addressed physical
injuries, products liability, and apportionment of liability as part of its third
effort at restating tort law, is now drafting a Restatement of Economic Torts
and Related Wrongs.' Dan Dobbs, author of a highly regarded torts trea-
tise, and his co-author Ellen Bublick have recently edited a comprehen-
sive, highly teachable casebook on advanced torts which devotes substan-
tial attention to economic torts. 3 In practice, disputes involving economic
torts are expanding as a mainstay of civil litigation practice, both because
of the apparently infinite capacity of businesses to engage in questionable
and dispute-generating behavior and because of the entrepreneurship of
I Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Camden.
2 RESTATEMENT (TIhIRD) OF ECONOMIC TORTS AND RELATED WRONGS (Council Draft No.
I, 2oo6).
3 DAN B. DOBBS & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED TORTS:
ECONOMIC AND DIGNITARY TORTS-BUSINESS, COMMERCIAL AND INTANGIBLE HARMS (2oo6).
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lawyers as the profitability of personal injury litigation declines due to the
success of the tort reform movement in contracting the rights of victims of
personal injuries. Because the upper-level torts course often has a strong
civil litigation focus, the course presents opportunities to respond to the
current manifestation of the continual ferment about reshaping the third
year of law school away from pure doctrinal courses and toward courses that
synthesize areas of doctrine and lawyering skills.
The construction of an advanced torts course requires making choices
about the inclusion and arrangement of doctrines and choices about the
pedagogical approach, which includes the selection of materials and cre-
ation of activities for students. The Article addresses each of these choices
in turn.
I. APPROACHES TO TEACHING ADVANCED TORTS
An advanced torts course is, to an extent, remedial, filling gaps left by the
focus on physical injuries in the first-year course. Typically, the gaps are
large, and the problem is not a new one; Chesterfield Oppenheim com-
mented in 1936 that "the scope of the first year course in Torts is already so
formidable as generally to preclude an adequate consideration of cases on
trade relations." 4 Because the course is partly remedial, the content and ap-
proach of the course at a particular school will be influenced by the cover-
age of that school's first-year course. Nevertheless, the course should have a
conceptual and pedagogical integrity of its own. Moreover, as the allocation
of time to the first-year course declines in many schools and as casebooks
for that course more and more coalesce on a limited number of doctrines,
the gaps become more common across schools and the objectives of the
advanced course become more common as well.
Courses on many legal subjects have a structure that is at least initially
obvious because there is an accepted doctrinal structure to the subject mat-
ter. In torts, there is a conventional classification of intent, negligence, and
strict liability, with additions or modifications such as products liability or
injuries to real property. In contracts, the accepted doctrinal structure is
formation, validation, performance, remedies, and third-party rights. Most
casebooks and courses, with some novel exceptions, largely follow these
structures. Perhaps because of its peripheral status, the legal field of eco-
nomic torts has never developed an accepted doctrinal structure, either in
general or for teaching purposes. And efforts to do so have never met with
general acceptance. This section surveys the principal attempts to concep-
tualize the subject for teaching purposes.'
4 S. CHESTERFIELD OPPENHEIM, CASES ON TRADE REGULATION 4 (936).
5 Scholars, particularly in the Commonwealth, have conceptualized the field indepen-
dent of teaching. Hazel Carry refers to the project of classifying economic torts as "an obvious
challenge to create order out of their chaos." HAZEL CARTY, AN ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC
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One approach to the advanced torts course might be simply to regard
it as residual, designed to survey all topics excluded by the emphasis on
personal injury in the basic course. Several of the casebooks under discus-
sion recognize the need to accommodate the concern of residual coverage.
If taken too far, however, this approach is uninteresting from an intellectual
point of view and largely unsatisfactory from a pedagogical point of view.
For the most part, the scholarship and teaching materials on the subject
manifest an explicit or implicit recognition of the point that legal subjects
ought to be coherent, and that coherence comes about through the imple-
mentation of some theory of the subject. 6
Aside from being intellectually satisfying, a general theory of the course
is actually useful to students. In understanding doctrines, it helps to have
a big picture, or several big pictures, to establish connections among doc-
trines and suggest themes and policies that underlie them. This is particu-
larly important in a field as fluid as economic torts, in which much of the
doctrine has developed or been reformulated in recent years and is still in
flux. The ability of lawyers and judges to make arguments and decide cases
best rests on a broad and deep understanding of the issues that can only be
achieved by having a conceptual approach to the doctrines, collections of
doctrines, and subject as a whole.
There have been three main approaches to the teaching of advanced
torts. The first approach, "the traditional canon of economic and dignitary
torts," uses the customary means of classifying torts according to the inter-
est invaded and actor's conduct to define the subject matter of advanced
torts.' This approach is used in the Dobbs and Bublick casebook, extend-
ing the format of Dobbs's popular hornbookY The second approach, the re-
lational interests approach, is based on Leon Green's realist-era analysis of
tort law and was used in successive editions of Green's own casebook and
currently in the Kutner and Reynolds casebook.9 The third approach, the
torts and trade regulation approach, links economic torts to other doctrines
of market regulation. 0 This approach has its origins in the early era of anti-
trust and has since incorporated strong elements of intellectual property; it
is used in different ways in different casebooks today.
TORTS V (2001); see also PETER CANE, TORT LAW AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS (1996); TONY WEIR,
ECONOMIC TORTS (1997).
6 A possible exception that emphasizes the residual nature of the course is GEORGE C.
CHRISTIE, JAMES E. MEEKS, ELLEN S. PRYOR & JOSEPH SANDERS, ADVANCED TORTS: CASES AND
MATERIALS (2004), which covers products liability and the role of insurance in the tort system,
as well as economic and dignitary torts. The book is designed to cover "in depth some of the
important topics of tort law that are either not covered or not covered in much depth in their
basic torts course." Id. at v.
7 See infra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
8 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAw OF TORTS (2000).
9 See infra notes 16-25 and accompanying text.
Io See infra notes 26-43 and accompanying text.
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This Article draws on these three approaches to rethink the course, ar-
guing for a particular business torts approach. This approach adds elements
of an advanced contracts course to the advanced torts course, more promi-
nently considering doctrines that provide liability and remedies in contrac-
tual settings beyond those traditionally afforded by contracts law. The re-
thinking suggests a link from the model of contracting that underlies these
doctrines to the model of the market-which is made up of contracts-that
underlies much of the market-regulating tort doctrines.
A. The Traditional Canon: Economic and Dignitary Torts
Tort law is conventionally subdivided according to the interest of the vic-
tim that is invaded and the nature of the tortfeasor's conduct, with all divi-
sions made along doctrinal lines. The familiar categories are physical injury
to the person, physical injury to property, and non-physical injury (divided
by interest); and intentional torts, negligence, and strict liability (divided
by conduct). The divisions are not always clean, and there are intermedi-
ate and overlapping categories. Non-physical injury includes both harm to
solely pecuniary interests and harm to other interests such as reputation.
Wrongful death and survival actions are technically economic but are usu-
ally treated as parasitic on physical harms, as negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress often is, too. Either the interest or the nature of the conduct
can be considered primary."1 Products liability is often pulled out for sepa-
rate treatment.
This conventional approach to tort classification provides an easily avail-
able approach to classifying advanced torts. Dan Dobbs and Ellen Bublick
use a primary focus on interests invaded and a subsidiary use of actor's
conduct in their recent casebook on advanced torts."2 This focus defines a
"traditional canon of economic and dignitary torts-those not associated
with physical harm to person or property" 3-traditional in the sense that it
uses the traditional mechanisms of classification even though they have not
often been used in teaching materials. The interests invaded are defined
by exclusion; what unites "economic or commercial harm" and "dignitary
affronts akin to or including emotional harms" is that "none of these torts
arises out of physical harm or physical contact."14
The conventional approach covers two general categories: "tort claims
that are often primarily based on intangible injuries of a highly personal or
I I Compare DOBBS, supra note 8, chs. z-3, with RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS ch. 1.B
('999)-
12 See CHRISTIE ET AL., supra note 6, for a similar treatment in the portion of their book
that addresses non-physical injury.
13 DOBBS & BUBLICK, supra note 3, at v.
14 Id. at I.
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dignitary nature" and "torts that are primarily economic in nature.""5 The
multiple qualifiers-"often" and "primarily"-are necessary because the
torts redressing intangible harm, such as defamation, often have a large
economic component, and the economic torts sometimes protect noneco-
nomic interests, such as the tort of bad faith breach of an insurance contract
that protects the insured's interest in emotional security.
The dignitary torts include:
* defamation;
* the privacy torts of intrusion, false light, and disclosure of private
facts (excluding the right of publicity, which is put in with the eco-
nomic torts);
a tortious litigation and tactics (malicious prosecution of a criminal
charge, wrongful civil litigation, and abuse of process); and
* interference with family relationships (the mostly archaic alien-
ation of affection and criminal conversation and the more current
abduction, harboring, or alienation of children, all treated very brief-
ly).
The economic torts include:
* "some nominate torts" (disparagement, bad faith breach of con-
tract, fiduciary breach, and conversion of intangibles);
* intentional interference with contracts and economic opportuni-
ties;
* unintended interference with economic interests (products and
the economic loss rule, and negligent interference with economic
interests and reputation);
* unfair competition and associated aspects of intellectual prop-
erty (copyright, trade secrets, misappropriation, trademark, and the
right of publicity);
* misrepresentation;
* statutory protection against misrepresentation and deceptive
practices (consumer protection, RICO 16, and others); and
* lawyer malpractice.
15 Id. at 3. The authors suggest that, at least for teaching purposes, the categories are also
linkedin ways other than their place in the taxonomy of torts. Issues that arise frequently in
civil litigation are included, and "fundamental policy and theory issues" arise under many of
the doctrines. Id. at vi.
16 The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, commonly referred to as
the RICO Act or RICO, is a federal statute that provides for extended penalties for crimi-
nal acts performed as part of an ongoing criminal organization. Sete i8 U.S.C.A. § I961 (West
2007).
2006-2007]
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B. Relational Interests
As part of his reexamination of tort law in the era of legal realism, Leon
Green offered a refinement on the classification of tort law according to the
interest invaded. Common-law torts traditionally had developed around
the interests of person and property. As the courts began to protect eco-
nomic and dignitary interests, the tendency was to do so by framing them
as extensions of the familiar protection of property. 7 Green's innovation
was to construct a category of relational interests to encompass the new
claims and then to subdivide the category according to the type of rela-
tion invaded. For the purposes of analysis as well as teaching, Leon Green
famously defined "relational interests";"s while much commented on, the
classification never achieved wide acceptance. In a series of articles 9 and
his heretical casebook, 0 Green argued that injuries to relations constituted
a distinct sphere of tort law. "The situation is this: plaintiff stands in some
relation to some other person; defendant hurts plaintiff's relation with that
person.""1 The interest protected is the relation. The value of the relation
may be diminished in a number of ways:
The relation may be hurt by a physical injury of one of the parties to the
relation, as for example the killing of a member of the family; by appropriat-
ing the advantages of the relation or by destroying it, as for example induc-
ing one party to violate his contract with another; by impairing the standing
of a person in his community, as for example publishing an accusation of his
dishonesty in business or office; or by denying a person some right he enjoys
as a member of a social or political group, as for example the right to vote or
hold office or other right of citizenship.22
17 Leon Green, Basic Concepts: Persons, Property, Relations, 24 A.B.A.J. 65 (1938); see also
LEON GREEN, THE LITIGATION PROCESS IN TORT LAW: No PLACE TO STOP IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF TORT LAW 413 (2d ed. 1977).
18 See generally G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
75-113, 149-53 (expanded ed. 2003).
19 Leon Green, Relational Interests, 29 U. ILL. L. REV. 460 (1934); Leon Green, Relational
Interests: Trade Relations, 29 U. ILL. L. REV. 1041 (935); Leon Green, Relational Interests:
Commercial Relations, 30 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (1935); Leon Green, Relational Interests: Professional
and Political Relations, 30 U. ILL. L. REV. 314 (1935); Leon Green, Relational Interests: General
Social Relations, 31 U. ILL. L. REV. 35 (1936). For a later summary, see Leon Green, Basic
Concepts: Persons, Property, Relations, 24 A.B.A.J. 65 (1938).
2o LEON GREEN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN TORT CASES (1931).
21 Leon Green, Relational Interests, 29 U. ILL. L. REV. 460, 462 (1934).
22 LEON GREEN, WILLARD H. PEDRICK, JAMES A RAHL, E. WAYNE TODE, CARL S. HAWKINS,
ALLEN E. SMITH & JAMES E. TREECE, ADVANCED TORTS: INJURIES TO BUSINESS, POLITICAL AND
FAMILY INTERESTS xiii (1977) (quoting the 1949 and 1969 editions of the casebook).
[Vol. 95
TEACHING TORTS
The relational interests include family relations, trade relations, profes-
sional relations, general social relations, and political relations.2 3 The re-
lational interests matched no other classification scheme; defamation was
included in professional, political, and general social relations. Nor were
the relational interests purely what are today regarded as economic inter-
ests; the principal injury to family relations comes from death or injury to
a family member giving rise to wrongful death or survival actions. Green's
category of trade relations encompassed much of economic torts, however.
Green's family relations include wrongful death and survival actions, per-
sonal injuries among or affecting family members, actions relating to ill
and deceased relatives, and alienation of affection and related torts. Profes-
sional relations resemble trade relations except that they involve the rela-
tions held by professionals, not businesses, and involve the professionals'
general standing in the community and economic interests. General social
relations are the right of people generally to have unimpaired social rela-
tions, principally the protection of reputation through the law of defama-
tion. Political relations encompass defamation of and by public officials and
interference with the rights of citizenship such as violating civil rights and
misusing government power such as through malicious prosecution.
Most important for present purposes are trade relations, sometimes de-
scribed as commercial relations. Green described the scope of injuries to
trade relations in different ways in a number of books and articles over a
span of decades. A useful list can be drawn from the most recent version
of Green's casebook (which is no longer in print).2 4 Trade relations there
include:
* interference with patronage or customer relations (physical in-
terference by violence or threat, malicious competition, cartels and
boycotts by competitors and non-competitors, passing off, trademark
infringement, defamation, disparagement, and false advertising);
* interference with business operations (physical interference; ap-
propriation of intangible assts in the public domain or not in the
public domain such as trade secrets, employee's knowledge or loy-
alty, ideas, characters, and likeness); and
* interference with contractual relations (covenants not to com-
pete and other contracts).
The contemporary book that most embodies Green's relational inter-
ests is Peter Kutner and Osborne Reynolds's Advanced Torts. 5 Intended to
fill the gaps left by subjects not typically included or adequately treated in
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 PETER B. KUTNER & OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., ADVANCED TORTS: CASES AND
MATERIALS (3d ed. 2006).
2oo6-2oo 7 ]
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the first-year course, the book's scope self-consciously emulates Green. 6
The selection of topics largely follows Green's list, although the arrange-
ment is different. The chapters include:
a family relations (injuries to family members, interference with
family relationships, and wrongful birth);
* economic relations (interference with contract and prospective
advantage, and negligent interference with economic relations);
* marketplace falsehoods (injurious falsehood or disparagement,
passing off and unfair competition, and false advertising);
a intangible assets (trade secrets and confidential information; and
misappropriation of literary, artistic, and commercial creations in-
cluding ideas);
e publicity and privacy (appropriation, intrusion, disclosure of pri-
vate facts, and false light);
* defamation; and
* judicial process and civil rights (malicious prosecution, wrong-
ful civil proceedings, abuse of process, and interference with civil
rights).
C. Trade Regulation
The traditional canon, interest-focused approach and Green's relational
interests share a primary orientation to the common law of torts, supple-
mented only by modest excursions into statutory analogues such as decep-
tive practices acts, intellectual property, or other topics that are necessary
to fully explore the issues raised by common-law liability. A very different
approach addresses economic torts as an instrument of trade regulation.
This approach has a long lineage and has developed in interesting and dif-
ferent ways in contemporary approaches to the material.
Early casebooks addressed only antitrust 7 until Herman Oliphant pub-
lished the first broader casebook on trade regulation in general in 1923.8
The casebook surveys common law and statutory rules that address market
competition. After a remarkable historical survey (including discussions of
the pre-market manorial village, the influence of the Black Death, the rise
and fall of the guilds, and laissez faire as striking the shackles from the
hands of labor, among other topics), 9 the casebook begins with a case from
26 Id. at iii.
27 See ALBERT M. KALES, CONTRACTS AND COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF T"ADE (1918).
28 HERMAN OLIPHANT, CASES ON TRADE REGULATION (1923). Oppenheim describes
Oliphant's casebook as the first to combine the study of unfair competition and antitrust. S.
CHESTERFIELD OPPENHEIM, CASES ON T"ADE REGULATION 2-3 (1936).
29 OLIPrHAr, supra note 28, at 1-33.
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the Yearbooks in 1415 concerning a dyer's covenant not to compete 3° and
concludes with the Sherman Act and other antitrust laws. Consistent with
the pedagogical style of early casebooks, text, explanation, and notes are
virtually absent.
Oliphant's book contains three parts: contracts not to compete, com-
petitive practices, and combinations.3
The part on contracts not to compete includes:
* contracts in early English trade (showing the ancient lineage of
the doctrines);
* contracts concerning the use of skill or enterprise (covenants by
employees or in the sale of a business, and trade secrets); and
o contracts tending toward restraint of trade or creating a monopo-
ly or combination.
The part on competitive practices includes:
* unfair competition (malicious competition and intimidation);
" disparagement;
• appropriation of trade values (trademarks, trade secrets, decep-
tive advertising, ideas, and other misappropriation);
* interference with contract;
" boycotts and exclusive dealing arrangements;
* unfair price practices (minimum pricing); and
* unfair advertising (passing off and Federal Trade Commission
regulation of deceptive advertising).
The part on combinations includes common-law regulation of contracts
in restraint of trade and the federal antitrust laws.
Oliphant was followed by Chesterfield Oppenheim, whose casebook
first appeared in 1936 and remains in print.3" Oppenheim followed Oliph-
ant's concept of trade regulation and expressed its implicit idea, that "the
delictual aspect of trade relation cases can be more effectively considered
when integrated with the doctrine of unfair competition. '33 Contracts not
to compete play a less prominent role for Oppenheim than Oliphant, but
Oppenheim follows Oliphant in making a primary division of the subject
into 1) unfair competitive practices and competition and 2) monopoly. Op-
30 YB. 2 Hen. 5, fol. 5, Anon. pl. 26 (1415); see a/so OLIPHANT, supra note 29, at 34.
31 See OLIPHANT, supra note 28. This is a summary of some categories, and many are
described in more contemporary terms.
32 PETER B. MAGGS & ROGER E. SCHECHTER, TADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW:
CASES AND COMMENTS (6th ed. 2002).
33 S. CHESTERFIELD OPPENIEIM, CASES ON TRADE REGULATION 4 (Warren A. Seavey ed.,
1936).
2oo6-2oo7]
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penheim also includes the same topics as Oliphant, although rearranged in
their order.
Over time the emphasis of the trade regulation approach has shifted.
Now the common-law remedies for unfair trade-practices are more likely
to be linked to intellectual property than to antitrust and related regulatory
bodies of law. The shift can be seen dramatically by comparing the fourth
edition of Oppenheim's casebook, published in 1983 and the last to bear
his name as co-author,34 with the current sixth edition, edited by successor
authors Peter B. Maggs and Roger E. Schechter.31
By the time the fourth edition was published, antitrust had become
established as an independent subject. As a result, the core antitrust issues
of combination and monopoly receive limited mention in the casebook,
with reference to some of the co-authors' antitrust casebook.3 6 The editors
note other developments: the rise of consumer protection, the increasing
importance of economic analysis, and new statutes and judicial opinions.
Those developments and with the notable addition of copyright, the topics
covered are similar to those of the first edition:
9 competition (common law privileges to enter markets and inter-
ference with contract and prospective relations);
* trademarks;
* misappropriation;
" copyright
" deceptive advertising, disparagement, and defamation;
" Federal Trade Commission regulation;
* consumer remedies for unfair and deceptive practices;
" the Robinson-Patman Act37; and
" state regulation of unfair pricing.
In the sixth edition, the authors recognized that "legal, economic and
social developments require a thorough rethinking of the organization and
content of a teaching book."3 Trademark and closely related topics (such
34 S. CHESTERFIELD OPPENHEIM, GLEN E. WESTON, PETER B. MAGGS & ROGER E.
SCHECHTER, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION (4 th ed. 1983).
35 See MAGGS & SCHECHTER, s.upra note 32. The fifth edition, mostly following the pat-
tern of the fourth, was published in 1992 under a different title. See GLEN E. WESTON, PETER
B. MAGGS & ROGER E. SCHECHTER, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION (5th
ed. 1992).
36 S. CHESTER OPPENHEIM, GLEN E. WESTON & J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAWS: CASES, TExT, AND COMMENTARY (4th ed. 1981). Collateral antitrust issues such as price
discrimination are covered in the casebook.
37 The Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, or Anti-Price Discrimination Act, is a federal law
that prohibits anticompetitive practices by producers, specifically price discrimination. See 15
U.S.C.A. § 13 (West 2007).
38 MAGGS & SCHECHTER, sUpra note 32, at v.
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as Internet domain name disputes) became the core of the book, which
expanded from 190 pages in the fourth edition to nearly 600 pages in the
sixth edition. The brief chapter on competition remains as an introduc-
tion; misappropriation and competitor, consumer, and public remedies for
deceptive advertising make up the rest of the book. The authors removed
copyright and price discrimination from the book to create space for the ac-
commodation of new materials, 39 but the prominence of copyright in other
courses and the insignificance of price discrimination are as likely reasons.
The same transformation of the trade regulation approach can be seen
in the casebook written by Edmund Kitch and Harvey Perlman. The first
edition of their casebook, Legal Regulation of the Competitive Process: Cases,
Materials and Notes on Unfair Business Practices, Trademarks, Copyrights and
Patents, published in 1972, 4 demonstrated the lack of clear definition of the
subject by aptly (if vaguely) describing the contents of the book as "a col-
lection of apparently diverse areas of law related in some way to business
activity."'" The authors explained:
Most law schools offer courses in anti-trust, in which the grand scheme
of free-enterprise economic regulation is considered. To the extent anti-
trust doctrines are successful, they tend to insure that business will be con-
ducted along competitive lines. The rules of the competitive process, once
competition is assured, are generally ignored.
We have attempted to draw together in one book, numerous doctrines,
which regulate the activity of competition .... We have tried to explore
the interrelationships of the areas presented and the fundamental legal con-
cepts and developments which pervade the competitive process. 4
In the first edition, Kitch and Perlman reported that "[tirademarks,
copyrights, and patents, if available [in the law school curriculum], are
generally taught in advanced seminars designed for students wishing to
specialize in these areas. '43 In the current fifth edition, the title of the
book-now retitled Intellectual Property and Unfair Competition, with no ex-
planatory subtitle'-and its emphasis have changed, adding intellectual
property materials to the chapter on the problem of entry, eliminating the
chapter on pricing practices, reducing the emphasis on consumer remedies
39 Id.
40 EDMUND W. KITCH & HARVEY S. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE
PROCESS: CASES, MATERIALS AND NOTES ON UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES, TRADEMARKS,
COPYRIGHTS AND PATENTS (1972).
41 Id. at xvii.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 EDMUND W. KITCH & HARVEY S. PERLMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION (5th ed. 1998).
2oo6-2oo 7 ]
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for deception, and giving concomitantly more space and weight to trade-
marks, copyrights, and patents.4"
II. ISSUES IN TEACHING ADVANCED TORTS
The advanced torts course is in part residual and local, addressing topics
that are treated inadequately, or not at all, in the first-year torts course.
Nevertheless, constructing the course ought to be more than assembling a
plate of leftovers. A substantial degree of conceptual unity is desirable both
because it helps make sense of the law school curriculum and, for students,
of the course itself. What is the most useful and interesting concept of the
advanced torts course in a law school that teaches personal injury torts in
the first year and intellectual property and antitrust in the upper level? For
students, what holds together the topics in the course other than that they
are things many lawyers should know?
Consideration of the traditional canon, relational interests, and trade
regulation approaches to the course raises some issues concerning the con-
struction of the course. On none of the issues is there unanimity among
these approaches; on each of them, the approaches suggest alternatives.
The issues are (1) the extent to which the course focuses on torts or on an-
other subject, and how specialized bodies of law are treated; (2) the extent
to which the course focuses on civil litigation, particularly subjects that are
important in a typical civil litigation practice; and (3) the extent to which
the course focuses on economic torts and how economic torts as a subject
matter is defined and conceptualized.
A. Torts as the Focus?
The first issue is the extent to which the course focuses on torts or on
another subject and how specialized bodies of law are treated. Although
all of the topics of the course have relatively simple common-law origins,
many of them have developed highly specialized bodies of law. If the focus
of the course is to remain on advanced torts, many of these topics deserve
mention but cannot receive extensive treatment. This is particularly true,
and the need for full treatment is particularly obviated, for those topics
that are the subject of stand-alone courses. Consumer fraud and consumer
protection statutes relate to the remedies for deceptive trade practices, for
example, but they are sufficiently complex that anything more than intro-
ductory treatment belongs in a consumer law course.
45 Other books in this area add elements of unfair competition to a predominant empha-
sis on trademarks. See, e.g., JANE C. GINSBURG, JESSICA LITMAN & MARY L. KEVLIN, TRADEMARK
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW (3d ed. 2ooi); BEVERLY W. PATTISHALL, DAVID CRAIG HILLIARD
& JOSEPH NYE WELCH II, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION (4th ed. zooo).
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Some versions of the trade regulation approach favor these specialized
subjects at the expense of more extensive treatment of the common-law
tort actions. When antitrust law was less fully developed, Oliphant com-
bined antitrust with the tort materials on competitive practices into a single
course.16 The contemporary core of trade regulation is intellectual property,
not antitrust, and Kitch and Perlman have taken the step of making intel-
lectual property primary and economic torts secondary; 47 at that point, the
course is much less an advanced torts course and much more an intellectual
property course with ancillary materials on competition and related sub-
jects.
B. Civil Litigation as the Focus?
The second issue is the extent to which the course focuses on civil liti-
gation, particularly subjects that are important in a typical civil litigation
practice. Resolving this issue shapes the emphasis of the course and the
inclusion of topics.
Every doctrine-based law school course mixes examination of the sub-
stance of the law and the way that substance is used in practice with con-
sideration of broader issues-what is usually referred to as "policy" and
other more general or theoretical issues that arise. The issue here is one of
degree. Particularly in the portion of the course that addresses economic
rather than dignitary torts, there can be two tendencies.
One tendency emphasizes that economic torts constitute the core of
many lawyers' non-personal injury civil litigation practice. Misrepresenta-
tion and interference may be the most powerful and frequently used weap-
ons in the civil litigator's arsenal, for example, with breach of fiduciary duty
and misappropriation following closely. From this perspective, the primary
question in the course is how lawyers use economic torts to support and
defend the business activities of their clients.
The other tendency emphasizes the policy issue that is entailed in many
of the economic torts: how the law should regulate competitive behavior in
the marketplace. From this perspective, the basic question is fairness and
utility, as expressed through doctrines that control relations between bar-
gaining parties and between businesses and their customers and competi-
tors. A course with this tendency is likely to devote more attention to some
of the specialized subjects mentioned above because of their importance
in establishing and controlling competition. In addition, many topics in the
course involve statutes that regulate market activity, with regulation being
accomplished through administrative enforcement (such as the FTC Act4"
46 See OLIPHANT, supra note z8.
47 See KITCH & PERLMAN, supra note 44.
48 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 41-58 (West 2007).
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and state unfair trade practices acts) or even criminal prosecution (such as
RICO49), as well as through civil litigation by competitors or customers.
Under this tendency, more extensive attention may be given to the paral-
lel regulatory structure as a means of effectuating policy, even though it is
of less importance in day-to-day law practice. Under the first tendency, by
contrast, those parallel enforcement structures deserve mention to provide
a complete understanding of the topics, but they deserve close examina-
tion only to the extent that they arise with frequency in a civil litigation
practice. For example, private actions under state consumer protection
laws deserve more consideration than actions by federal or state agencies.
The choice between these tendencies affects the topics included in
the course as well as its emphasis. Several doctrines that are not primarily
directed at competitive behavior figure frequently in business litigation.
The two most important sets of such doctrines are the wrongful litigation
torts-malicious prosecution of criminal or civil cases, abuse of process, and
the related anti-SLAPP measures-and the two related doctrines of aiding
and abetting and conspiracy. An emphasis on civil litigation practice needs
to include them because of their importance; an emphasis on competitive
regulation may exclude them.
C. Economic Torts as the Focus?
The third issue is the extent to which the course focuses on economic torts,
and how economic torts as a subject matter is defined and conceptualized.
The basic choice here is between a more general advanced torts course
and what is better described as a business torts course. In the traditional
canon and the relational interests approaches, the selection of topics for
inclusion is based on the interests that are invaded, many of which have
little or nothing to do with market competition. In the traditional canon,
the interests are defined as the residue of the first-year course's primary
focus on physical injuries, so the interests affected are dignitary and other
intangible interests and the interest in avoiding solely economic harm. In
the relational interests approach, the interests are the idiosyncratic set of
relational interests defined by Green that are also the residue of tort law's
main attention to physical injury. Business torts, as suggested by the trade
regulation approach, instead focuses on doctrines aimed primarily at defin-
ing and regulating appropriate means of market competition. As a result,
the business torts approach excludes intentional infliction of emotional
distress and the family relations torts. Prosser classified the privacy torts
to include appropriation of identity, intrusion, false lights, and disclosure
of private facts; ° only the former of those is market-directed and typically
49 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 196I-1968 (West 2007).
50 William L. Prosser, Privay, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383,389 (960).
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figures in business tort litigation. Commercial defamation is a business tort,
but the extensive treatment of defamation in general, including all of the
constitutional issues, given under a broader advanced torts approach is less
suited to a business torts focus.
More broadly defined, business torts includes not only doctrines aimed
primarily at defining and regulating appropriate means of market competi-
tion, but also issues arising out of contractual relationships other than ordi-
nary breach of contract. The primary impetus for an advanced torts course
is the gap in coverage of the first-year torts course. There is a parallel gap
in the typical first-year contracts course, in which issues such as the conflict
between contract and tort law embodied in the economic loss rule (among
other places), misrepresentation, and bad faith breach are covered inad-
equately, if at all.
III. AN EXAMPLE: TEACHING BUSINESS TORTS
The issues about the extent of focus on advanced torts, civil litigation, and
economic torts can be resolved in a variety of ways. Each of the casebooks
discussed provides an example of a different resolution of the issues. Here
is an additional example of a course that adopts a civil litigation, economic
torts emphasis.
This course covers the following topics in the following order:
* The economic loss rule
" Breach of fiduciary duty
" Misrepresentation in two-party cases
" Good faith in contract and bad faith breach of contract
* Economic negligence, defined as the liability of professionals
and businesses to third parties (i.e., not to their contracting part-
ners)
* Interference with contract and interference with prospective
economic advantage
* Unfair competition, including antitrust, RICO,51 liability under
unfair trade practices statutes, and the residual common-law unfair
competition action
* Copyright, briefly, as it plays a role in business tort litigation be-
tween competitors and as a comparison to trademark
" Trademark, including dilution
* Deception, including the appropriation of trade values broader
than trademark, Lanham Act §43(a),s1 and passing off
51 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968 (West 2007).
52 15 U.S.C.A. § I 125(a) (West 2007).
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* Disparagement, including product disparagement and commer-
cial defamation
* Misappropriation, including identity, trade secrets, and common-
law misappropriation
" Wrongful litigation
* Aiding and abetting, and conspiracy
This list most resembles the economic torts portion of Dobbs and Bub-
lick's traditional canon, 3 excluding coverage of the dignitary torts, which
are not primarily concerned with market competition. It also includes ele-
ments of the modern versions of Green's trade relations and the trade regu-
lation approaches. s4 The more distinctive feature of this approach, then, is
not the selection of topics but their arrangement, which is largely based on
the definition of economic torts.
The first half of the course builds around the part of the broad defini-
tion of economic torts that addresses issues arising out of contractual rela-
tionships other than ordinary breach of contract; these issues are covered in
the economic loss rule, two-party misrepresentation, the obligation of good
faith and bad faith breach, economic negligence, and interference. These
issues are not ordinarily covered in the first-year contracts course, and that
makes it useful to examine them and to do so together. But there is a con-
ceptual link as well. A main purpose of contract law is to enforce bargains
made by knowledgeable parties who have freely bargained to advantage.
The liability and remedy rules of ordinary contract law are adequate to
serve that purpose in most instances, but in these classes of cases those
rules are arguably inadequate.
Each of the doctrines in the first half expresses that purpose. The eco-
nomic loss rule establishes the primacy of this concept of bargaining by
preventing incursions of tort law into contractual settings. The principal
exception to the economic loss rule is fraud in the inducement; contract
assumes fair bargaining by parties who are or have the opportunity to be
informed about relevant facts, and misrepresentation by one party subverts
that process. Contract also assumes that parties who have entered into a
contract will not violate the norms of contracting or take opportunistic ad-
vantage; bad faith performance or breach betrays that assumption. Con-
tractual stability is an important social value, and it must be protected from
attack; contracts are attacked by tortious interference with contractual rela-
tionships or prospective contractual relationships. 5
53 See DOBBS & BUBLICK, supra note 3.
54 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
55 The metaphor of contract being subverted, betrayed, or attacked is an expansion of
Hugh Collins's likening of classical contract law to an emperor who has absolute power capa-
ble of being undermined only by force or treachery. See Jay M. Feinman, Contract After the Fall,
39 STAN. L. REV. 1537, 1543 (1987); see also HUGH COLLINS, ThE LAw OF CONTRACT 58 (1986).
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The remaining topics are fiduciary duty and economic negligence. The
existence and scope of a fiduciary duty sometimes can be shaped by a con-
tract, but the idea of fiduciary duty is broader than contract. Economic neg-
ligence, or liability to a noncontracting third party, involves an extension of
contract, not the protection of contractual relationships. Considering fidu-
ciary duty and economic negligence therefore raises the question of when
contract law can be supplemented or supplanted.
The source and content of fiduciary obligation are defined by the law
because of entrustment, dependence, inequality, or other factors that can
remove the limitations of contract law. 56 The debate about the nature of
fiduciary duty frames the issue sharply. Under the hypothetical contract
analysis of fiduciary duty, the law's creation of fiduciary duties is no more
than a gap-filler to address issues that parties, typically but not exclusively
in contractual settings, have not decided for themselves. The means of fill-
ing the gaps is by imagining the deal the parties would have struck had
they adverted to the issue-the hypothetical contract reached by rational
parties who seek to maximize their joint welfare through the contract. The
critique of the hypothetical contract analysis points out that fiduciary duty
has long been considered to be imposed for reasons of equity in relations
of dependence. In that sense, fiduciary duty is independent of contract and
based on external standards of responsibility. 7
This dispute becomes a recurrent theme throughout the course. There
are two conflicting conceptions of the nature of obligation in contractual
settings and, more broadly, in the law's interaction with market competi-
tion. One is a contract-centered conception, in which the ideal of the bar-
gained contract is primary, and it only needs to be supplemented by exter-
nal standards and other bodies of law when the preconditions of contracting
are absent. The preconditions of contracting include access to information,
relative equality of the parties, and the opportunity to bargain. The other
is a balanced conception, in which contractual standards of liability and
external standards of liability each have independent and equal status, and
the issue on a particular doctrine or in a particular case or class of cases is
how the balance should be struck between contractual and noncontractual
liability.
In fiduciary cases, the conflict between bodies of law is between con-
tract and fiduciary duty. In the other cases, the conflict is between contract
and tort. Is contract primary and tort supplemental, as the strong version
of the economic loss rule would have it, or do contract and tort each have
independent integrity? Economic negligence frames this conflict clearly.
Two parties have a contract, the negligent performance or breach of which
injures a third party. The third party clearly has a cause of action if it quali-
56 See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988
DUKE L.J. 879, 887.
57 Id. at 886-88.
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fies as a third-party beneficiary under contract law. If it does not so qualify,
might it still have an action in tort for negligence or negligent misrepre-
sentation because of the interests that those areas of tort law seek to pro-
tect?58
The same conflict suggests reconsideration of the other topics. Misrep-
resentation can be seen as supplemental to contract law in cases in which
the misrepresentation undermines the bargaining process. However, the
first element of the cause of action for misrepresentation is a misstatement
of fact, and that element has expanded to include misstatement of inten-
tion. This expansion presents cases in which the misstatement of fact takes
the form of a misstatement of intention to perform a promise or misstate-
ment of the ability to perform a promise; in those cases, the misrepresenta-
tion action becomes available where, because of the strictures of contract
law doctrine, the contract action is not available. Channel Master Corp. v.
Aluminum Ltd. Sales, Inc. is the best known of these cases, in which the New
York Court of Appeals allowed a misrepresentation action for what was es-
sentially breach of a seller's promise s9 Karl Liewellyn-a contracts schol-
ar---condemned the decision as undermining contract law and sparking "as
unconsidered a jamboree as ever has been suggested" by torts scholars.'
Similarly, the delineation of the contours of the economic loss rule is es-
sentially a debate about the relative scope of contract and tort law. In good
faith, the essential issues are the source and content of the good faith obli-
gation. There are two classic views. The foregone opportunities approach
holds that the essence of good faith is preventing parties from recapturing
gains foregone in the making of the bargain. 61 It is, therefore, of a piece
with the hypothetical contract approach to fiduciary duty, designed only
to provide contract terms that are implicit in their bargain or to which they
would have agreed. The excluder analysis asserts that the obligation of
good faith excludes types of bad faith conduct based on community stan-
dards external to the contract, and therefore is tort-like in its imposition of
obligation. 6
Interference plays out these ideas in a way that provides transition to
the second half of the course. There are two interference torts, interference
with contract and interference with prospective economic advantage, and
each presents a puzzle.
58 See generally JAY M. FEINMAN, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES (2d ed. 2007).
59 Channel Master Corp. v. Aluminum Ltd. Sales, i5 1 N.E.zd 833, 836 (N.Y. 1958).
6o KARL N. LLEWELLYN, ThE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 473 (1960).
6I Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith,
94 HARv. L. REV. 369, 378 (1980).
62 Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195, 201 (1968); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981).
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Interference with contract involves actions by a noncontracting third
party that induce a breach of contract or interfere with the performance of
a contract by the victim's contracting partner. The victim has a remedy in
contract law against the partner for breach of the contract. In many cases
that remedy is fully effective to protect the victim's expectation interest,
and indeed may be coextensive with the remedy that would be provided by
the interference tort. In classic inducement cases, for example, the contract
remedy is a negative injunction against the partner to prevent her from
entering into a relationship with the third party that would constitute a
breach of contract; the tort remedy for interference is an injunction against
the third party to prevent him from entering into the same relationship.
The puzzle is why the tort remedy is necessary when the contract remedy
is available.
Interference with prospective advantage involves similar actions by a
third party except that the interest of the victim interfered with is not the
performance of a contract because no contract exists. Instead, the interest is
in the expectation of a future contractual relationship, such as the expecta-
tion of future business from one's regular customers. The puzzle is why this
interest is worthy of protection if it has not yet ripened into a contract and
may never do so.
The usual answer to the puzzle presented by interference with contract
is that society has an interest in contractual stability that demands protec-
tion beyond that afforded by contract law. That interest is not fully recog-
nized by a breach of contract action but requires sanction of the interfer-
ing third party. The usual answer to the puzzle presented by interference
with prospective advantage is two-fold. First, the behavior of the interfer-
ing third party may be wrongful in some measure beyond the interference
itself; a common test is whether the third party has exercised improper
means in taking away the expectancy. Second, contractual relationships are
not the only relationships of value in society; customer relations, business
goodwill, and the fruits of enterprise should also be protected by law in
some circumstances.
This analysis of the interference torts provides the link to the second
half of the course. There is a continuum from protection of existing con-
tracts to the protection of prospective relations. For cases farther along the
continuum more may be required for legal intervention, just as interfer-
ence with prospective relations is not wrongful in itself, but there is no
doubt that intervention is appropriate in some cases. Intervention is ap-
propriate to sanction improper conduct that interferes with the opportunity
to contract fairly-that is, to fairly compete on the market. Thus the con-
tinuum can be broadened: Each contract is an individual transaction, and
the sum of all transactions-the sum of all contracts-is the market, and
the continuum moves from fair contracting through fair competition.
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Market-regulating doctrines are in one sense vehicles for effectuating
the model of contract in society as a whole. Doctrines such as misrepre-
sentation are necessary to supplement contract law in cases in which the
processes of contracting are undermined. Similarly, doctrines such as the
regulation of deceptive practices are necessary in cases in which the pro-
cesses of market competition are undermined. The market is primary, and
the competitive values of the market also are primary. One means of en-
forcing those values is to allow all competitive behavior except for behavior
that, as with contract, subverts, betrays, or attacks market competition.
In a different sense, market-regulating doctrines are not only directed
at establishing a free market as primary. Like tort law or fiduciary law in
the noncontractual perspective, they serve nonmarket goals, such as fair-
ness, the protection of consumers, correcting imbalances caused by market
transactions, and the observance of reasonable commercial standards
Thus, for example, the regulation of deceptive practices is not only
about establishing adequately informed contracting but also about redress-
ing the balance between large producers and small consumers.
The continuum from contracting to competition moves from interfer-
ence with prospective relations to interference with competitive processes
generally, and moves the course from the focus on contract to the focus on
competition. For example, under the broad rubric of unfair competition,
antitrust speaks to efforts at subverting normal market processes through
monopolization, attempts to monopolize, or the traditionally defined class
of contracts in restraint of trade, but it speaks to those efforts in different
voices. Beginning with the debates over the Sherman Act 63 and continuing
to the present, a frequent debate has been whether antitrust is intended
only to preserve a competitive marketplace or is designed to serve other
goals as well, such as an attack on "bigness" and the protection of small
businesses. State and federal statutes such as the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act 64 and unfair and deceptive practices acts likewise have different
emphases. Many of the state statutes specify particular actions that are im-
proper. The Pennsylvania act, for example, lists seventeen specific types
of wrongdoing.6 Other statutes and the FTC Act take a general approach,
prohibiting unfair and deceptive practices and leaving it to the administra-
tive agency and the courts to spell out what that means. In fleshing out the
general statutes, decisionmakers must consider to what extent nonmarket
goals are to be served by regulating competition.
The broadest question in the law of unfair competition is whether there
are general standards of morality in the marketplace that the law should
impose for reasons other than establishing the preconditions of fair compe-
63 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7 (West 2007).
64 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 41-58 (West 2007).
65 Pa. Unfair Trade Practices Act, 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 201-2(4) (2004).
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tition. The question is posed sharply in considering the Restatement Third of
Unfair Competition. The Restatement takes an extreme position; its section
one contains what may be the only general statement of non-liability in any
of the Restatements: "One who causes harm to the commercial relations of
another by engaging in a business or trade is not subject to liability to the
other for such harm unless" he violates a specific prohibition of the Re-
statement, which include only deceptive marketing, trademark infringe-
ment, or misappropriation, or a statute.66 Section 1(b) includes a residual
provision for acts prohibited by "general principles of common law," but
the comments suggest that the residuum is severely limited.67
Other topics in the course address more specific ways in which the law
protects and regulates market competition. Trademark, for example, exists
only because it has market value. The value of a trademark is the associa-
tion in the marketplace between the mark and its owner or, as it is often
stated, between product and producer. That association defines the very
existence of a trademark; once a trademark loses that association by becom-
ing generic, it no longer is a trademark. Copyright provides an interesting
comparison. Copyright is a property right that exists independent of market
value; the author has a copyright in an original work of authorship that has
no commercial value at all. Copyright serves market and nonmarket goals;
the promotion of "science and useful arts" ' encourages development in
the commercial and noncommercial spheres
From the market perspective, deception, disparagement, and commer-
cial defamation are extensions of the interest in fair competition. Consum-
ers require accurate information, so competitors should be able to impose
liability for misrepresentations directed at the marketplace. Thus decep-
tion moves beyond trademarks to protect the value of fair competition in
the representation of products (either the plaintiff's or the competitor's)
and advertising, as under Lanham Act sections 43(a) and 43(b), 69 and in
the reputation of one's business or products. Each requires proof of wrong-
fulness, deception, and competitive effect. The element of wrongfulness
introduces the regulatory theme, but the focus is on market effects.
Misappropriation more clearly has dual aspects. On the one hand, mis-
appropriation doctrinus are property-like, protecting established interests
against invasion. On the other hand, they are market-oriented, protecting
trade values that resemble property but limiting the scope of protection
to their use in competition. As the law of trade secrets has developed, it
has moved more in the direction of limiting protection to information that
66 RESTATEMENT (T1IIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 (1995).
67 RESTATEMENT (TIhIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § I, cmt. g (1995). The venerable Tuttle
v. Buck, Ii9 N.W. 946, 948 (Minn. 1909), suggests one traditional component of the residu-
um--competing with an ill motive-but the Restatement rejects even that.
68 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
69 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a), (b) (West 2007).
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has substantial economic value, which value is often demonstrated by the
owner's efforts to preserve its secrecy. In the law of identity, there is a con-
flict between its traditional association with the law of privacy-protecting
a person's right to control name or likeness as a matter of personal auton-
omy-and an approach that views identity simply as another marketable
commodity, protectible only because it could be or even has been exploit-
ed by its owner. Once again, the Restatement of Unfair Competition adopts a
narrow, market-focused view that limits misappropriation to trade values
and even rejects the kind of general action for misappropriation decribed
in International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), except
in the circumstance of direct competition in one's primary market.7"
Finally, wrongful litigation and aiding and abetting and conspiracy are
essential to the course because of their importance in civil litigation, but
they do not fit the pattern of market regulation. They are frequently used
in cases involving competitors and overlap other causes of action, often
establishing liability among all defendants for acts directly committed only
by some of them. Their presence confirms the importance of nonmarket
values as a source of liability.
IV. PEDAGOGICAL ISSUES
As it is usually stated, the core of the law school curriculum is accumulat-
ing a base of doctrinal knowledge and acquiring the skill of "thinking like
a lawyer"-analyzing cases and statutes and generating legal arguments.
Most of that skill and much of the knowledge is acquired at a basic level
in the first year, and doctrinal courses thereafter only offer more of the
same-more practice at analysis and argumentation and more knowledge
to acquire.
Almost since Langdell and Ames created the modern law school, it
seems, this model of the upper-level curriculum has been criticized pre-
cisely because it is just more of the same. Upper-level courses of this sort
do not advance students' abilities in a dramatic way, nor do they offer op-
portunities to learn other valuable lawyer skills. A variety of efforts have
attempted to remedy these deficiencies: seminars, advanced simulations,
clinical programs, capstone courses, and even reorientation of the upper-
level.
In most law schools, the future will be much like the past. Despite the
variety of new offerings, students after their first year will continue to take a
large number of courses that are defined by bodies of doctrine and that are
taught with large enrollments in traditional class-hour formats. Advanced
torts or business torts is one of those courses. Conceptualizing the subject
70 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 38 cmt. c (1995).
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matter of the course as this Article has done is only the first step. The sec-
ond step is conceptualizing the teaching of the subject matter.
Business torts is not unique among upper-level courses, so much of what
might be done with it from a teaching perspective applies to other courses,
too. The course does have several features that are sufficiently distinctive
and interesting that they provide more reason for offering the course. The
themes also suggest some pedagogical approaches that are particularly use-
ful in the course.
First, the course builds more directly than many other courses on ma-
terial studied in the first year of law school. The first half of the course
requires an extensive review of basic contract and tort principles, and those
principles, together with some understanding of the nature of property,
resonate throughout the second half of the course.
Second, the course has a limited set of themes that arise in connection
with almost every doctrinal issue in the course. The themes provide the
means of developing and rehearsing a common argumentative structure
across the doctrines. The link from bargained contract to market competi-
tion and the idea that contract and competition are core values is central to
the course. The idea of nonmarket values recurs as a counter-theme.
Third, the doctrines studied are cumulative as well as sequential. For
example, misrepresentation and interference may be the most general
torts studied, and they arise often in cases involving other issues. Many
cases lie at the borderland of misrepresentation, fiduciary duty, and un-
fair competition. A party who is in a relationship that does not fall within
a classic fiduciary duty may nevertheless arguably owe a quasi-fiduciary
duty, a heightened duty that is violated by a nondisclosure actionable as a
misrepresentation, or a duty to act in a manner that does not violate norms
of competition. Actions between competitors for marketplace falsehoods
often involve trademark, section 43(a),71 and product disparagement.
Fourth, although the doctrines in the course have strong theoretical and
policy dimensions, the course is focused on the doctrines, theories, and
policies as they are manifested in law practice. The civil litigation focus of
the course shapes not only the selection of topics but also the orientation of
the course.
These distinctive features suggest an approach to the course that intro-
duces students to the doctrine, engages them in applying the doctrine to
litigation or litigation-preventing situations, and builds on those situations
to examine the theories and policies involved. This approach departs from
the more-of-the-same emphasis in upper-level doctrinal courses.7"
Departing from more-of-the-same first involves using materials that are
more expository than is common in basic casebooks. The objective is to
71 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125 (a) (West 2007).
72 Materials that illustrate the pedagogical approach in more detail are available from
the author.
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provide a more efficient means for students to acquire doctrinal knowledge
than by reading many cases; that is, to simulate the way practicing lawyers
acquire knowledge. Text material is most helpful. Dobbs and Bublick in-
tersperse cases with edited selections from the Dobbs treatise, and that
is a useful approach. Taking this further, longer excerpts from treatises or
summaries directed at lawyers are most useful. The problem here is cost.
The ABA publishes several paperbacks that fit the subject well, but even
at classroom discounts their cost is prohibitive. The Restatement of Unfair
Competition, modestly supplemented by cases and statutes, is an excellent
text on unfair competition in general, deceptive marketing, trademarks,
and misappropriation, but the ALl recently has ceased publishing the pa-
perback student edition, and the hardcover is expensive.
An alternative is the selection of cases that survey particular topics,
which can be reproduced from public domain sources or under license from
commercial databases. Perhaps because many of these doctrines are in flux,
there are a number of excellent opinions for this purpose, particularly from
state supreme courts.
A final alternative is the presentation of basic doctrine and issues
through lectures and written materials. When good written materials are
unavailable on selected topics, it is not difficult for a professor with a rea-
sonable command of the subject to prepare a lecture with a published out-
line as an introduction.
If most of the materials are expository, discussion then centers not
around the doctrines presented in the materials but their application. The
core of the course is a series of problems that require students to apply the
doctrines in the role of a lawyer. This is hardly a new idea; both the Christie
et al. and Dobbs and Bublick casebooks include a number of problems. But
the difference is in requiring problems as the central activity of the course,
rather than one among several.
Some problems can be relatively simple, to explicate the elements of a
doctrine as applied to a range of situations. For the most part, though, the
problems should be complex and cumulative. A relatively detailed state-
ment of facts requires students to identify relevant facts and the causes
of action that may be available on those facts, confront the ambiguity of
the doctrines in application, and consider problems of proof in establishing
the causes of action. As the semester goes on and problems become more
cumulative, they require students to understand how a single set of facts
can give rise to many causes of action and to consider the relationship of
different doctrines as they overlap on the facts. The result of this kind of
advanced exercise is to require students to bring to bear different bodies
of knowledge, including not only all of the subject matter of the course but
material from other courses as well, from contracts and torts through evi-
dence and procedure. It also requires students to integrate knowledge and
skill, identify issues, evaluate probabilities, make arguments, and some-
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times even frame those arguments in writing in a memorandum, complaint,
or brief. Finally, it merges theory and practice because understanding the
doctrines and arguing the causes of action can be done most effectively by
using broad themes such as the goals of market regulation as instantiated
in particular cases and doctrines.
CONCLUSION
The field of economic torts occupies an odd status in the law school curric-
ulum. The torts are central to the practices of many lawyers, and some ver-
sions of a course in economic torts have venerable lineages. Yet the course
is not as widely taught as it might be, and the emphasis on civil litigation
involving economic torts is threatened by incursions from other fields such
as antitrust and intellectual property. The Restatement project, the publi-
cation of the new Dobbs and Bublick casebook, and the opportunity to use
the course to synthesize doctrine and practice may portend more extensive
offerings of this important subject.

